I spoke the other day of the colossal military
disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw
the northern Armies from Belgium at the moment when they knew that the
French front was decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse. This
delay entailed the loss of fifteen or sixteen French divisions and
threw out of action for the critical period the whole of the British
Expeditionary Force. Our Army and 120,000 French troops were indeed
rescued by the British Navy from Dunkirk but only with the loss of
their cannon, vehicles and modern equipment. This loss inevitably took
some weeks to repair, and in the first two of those weeks the battle in
France has been lost. When we consider the heroic resistance made by
the French Army against heavy odds in this battle, the enormous losses
inflicted upon the enemy and the evident exhaustion of the enemy, it
may well be the thought that these 25 divisions of the best-trained and
best-equipped troops might have turned the scale. However, General
Weygand had to fight without them. Only three British divisions or
their equivalent were able to stand in the line with their French
comrades. They have suffered severely, but they have fought well. We
sent every man we could to France as fast as we could re-equip and
transport their formations.
I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of recrimination.
That I judge to be utterly futile and even harmful. We cannot afford
it. I recite them in order to explain why it was we did not have, as we
could have had, between twelve and fourteen British divisions fighting
in the line in this great battle instead of only three. Now I put all
this aside. I put it on the shelf, from which the historians, when they
have time, will select their documents to tell their stories. We have
to think of the future and not of the past. This also applies in a
small way to our own affairs at home. There are many who would hold an
inquest in the House of Commons on the conduct of the Governments-and
of Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during the years which led up
to this catastrophe. They seek to indict those who were responsible for
the guidance of our affairs. This also would be a foolish and
pernicious process. There are too many in it. Let each man search his
conscience and search his speeches. I frequently search mine.
Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past
and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future. Therefore,
I cannot accept the drawing of any distinctions between Members of the
present Government. It was formed at a moment of crisis in order to
unite all the Parties and all sections of opinion. It has received the
almost unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament. Its Members are
going to stand together, and, subject to the authority of the House of
Commons, we are going to govern the country and fight the war. It is
absolutely necessary at a time like this that every Minister who tries
each day to do his duty shall be respected; and their subordinates must
know that their chiefs are not threatened men, men who are here today
and gone tomorrow, but that their directions must be punctually and
faithfully obeyed. Without this concentrated power we cannot face what
lies before us. I should not think it would be very advantageous for
the House to prolong this Debate this afternoon under conditions of
public stress. Many facts are not clear that will be clear in a short
time. We are to have a secret Session on Thursday, and I should think
that would be a better opportunity for the many earnest expressions of
opinion which Members will desire to make and for the House to discuss
vital matters without having everything read the next morning by our
dangerous foes.
The disastrous military events which have
happened during the past fortnight have not come to me with any sense
of surprise. Indeed, I indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I could
to the House that the worst possibilities were open; and I made it
perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France would make no
difference to the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight
on, '~f necessary for years, if necessary alone." During the last few
days we have successfully brought off the great majority of the troops
we had on the line of communication in France; and seven-eighths of the
troops we have sent to France since the beginning of the war-that is to
say, about 350,000 out of 400,000 men-are safely back in this country.
Others are still fighting with the French, and fighting with
considerable success in their local encounters against the enemy. We
have also brought back a great mass of stores, rifles and munitions of
all kinds which had been accumulated in France during the last nine
months.
We have, therefore, in this Island today a very
large and powerful military force. This force comprises all our
best-trained and our finest troops, including scores of thousands of
those who have already measured their quality against the Germans and
found themselves at no disadvantage. We have under arms at the present
time in this Island over a million and a quarter men. Behind these we
have the Local Defense Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a
portion of whom, however, are yet armed with rifles or other firearms.
We have incorporated into our Defense Forces every man for whom we have
a weapon. We expect very large additions to our weapons in the near
future, and in preparation for this we intend forthwith to call up,
drill and train further large numbers. Those who are not called up, or
else are employed during the vast business of munitions production in
all its branches-and their ramifications are innumerable-will serve
their country best by remaining at their ordinary work until they
receive their summons. We have also over here Dominions armies. The
Canadians had actually landed in France, but have now been safely
withdrawn, much disappointed, but in perfect order, with all their
artillery and equipment. And these very high-class forces from the
Dominions will now take part in the defense of the Mother Country.
Lest the account which I have given of these large forces should
raise the question: Why did they not take part in the great battle in
France? I must make it clear that, apart from the divisions training
and organizing at home, only 12 divisions were equipped to fight upon a
scale which justified their being sent abroad. And this was fully up to
the number which the French had been led to expect would be available
in France at the ninth month of the war. The rest of our forces at home
have a fighting value for home defense which will, of course, steadily
increase every week that passes. Thus, the invasion of Great Britain
would at this time require the transportation across the sea of hostile
armies on a very large scale, and after they had been so transported
they would have to be continually maintained with all the masses of
munitions and supplies which are required for continuous battle-as
continuous battle it will surely be.
Here is where we come
to the Navy-and after all, we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget
that we have a Navy. We must remind them. For the last thirty years I
have been concerned in discussions about the possibilities of oversea
invasion, and I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at
the beginning of the last war, of allowing all regular troops to be
sent out of the country. That was a very serious step to take, because
our Territorials had only just been called up and were quite untrained.
Therefore, this Island was for several months particularly denuded of
fighting troops. The Admiralty had confidence at that time in their
ability to prevent a mass invasion even though at that time the Germans
had a magnificent battle fleet in the proportion of 10 to 16, even
though they were capable of fighting a general engagement every day and
any day, whereas now they have only a couple of heavy ships worth
speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau. We are also told that
the Italian Navy is to come out and gain sea superiority in these
waters. If they seriously intend it, I shall only say that we shall be
delighted to offer Signor Mussolini a free and safeguarded passage
through the Strait of Gibraltar in order that he may play the part to
which he aspires. There is a general curiosity in the British Fleet to
find out whether the Italians are up to the level they were at in the
last war or whether they have fallen off at all.
Therefore, it seems to me that as far as sea-borne invasion on a great
scale is concerned, we are far more capable of meeting it today than we
were at many periods in the last war and during the early months of
this war, before our other troops were trained, and while the B.E.F.
had proceeded abroad. Now, the Navy have never pretended to be able to
prevent raids by bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men flung suddenly across
and thrown ashore at several points on the coast some dark night or
foggy morning. The efficacy of sea power, especially under modern
conditions, depends upon the invading force being of large size; It has
to be of large size, in view of our military strength, to be of any
use. If it is of large size, then the Navy have something they can find
and meet and, as it were, bite on. Now, we must remember that even five
divisions, however lightly equipped, would require 200 to 250 ships,
and with modern air reconnaissance and photography it would not be easy
to collect such an armada, marshal it, and conduct it across the sea
without any powerful naval forces to escort it; and there would be very
great possibilities, to put it mildly, that this armada would be
intercepted long before it reached the coast, and all the men drowned
in the sea or, at the worst blown to pieces with their equipment while
they were trying to land. We also have a great system of minefields,
recently strongly reinforced, through which we alone know the channels.
If the enemy tries to sweep passages through these minefields, it will
be the task of the Navy to destroy the mine-sweepers and any other
forces employed to protect them. There should be no difficulty in this,
owing to our great superiority at sea.
Those are the
regular, well-tested, well-proved arguments on which we have relied
during many years in peace and war. But the question is whether there
are any new methods by which those solid assurances can be
circumvented. Odd as it may seem, some attention has been given to this
by the Admiralty, whose prime duty and responsibility is to destroy any
large sea-borne expedition before it reaches, or at the moment when it
reaches, these shores. It would not be a good thing for me to go into
details of this. It might suggest ideas to other people which they have
not thought of, and they would not be likely to give us any of their
ideas in exchange. All I will say is that untiring vigilance and
mind-searching must be devoted to the subject, because the enemy is
crafty and cunning and full of novel treacheries and stratagems. The
House may be assured that the utmost ingenuity is being displayed and
imagination is being evoked from large numbers of competent officers,
well-trained in tactics and thoroughly up to date, to measure and
counterwork novel possibilities. Untiring vigilance and untiring
searching of the mind is being, and must be, devoted to the subject,
because, remember, the enemy is crafty and there is no dirty trick he
will not do.
Some people will ask why, then, was it that
the British Navy was not able to prevent the movement of a large army
from Germany into Norway across the Skagerrak? But the conditions in
the Channel and in the North Sea are in no way like those which prevail
in the Skagerrak. In the Skagerrak, because of the distance, we could
give no air support to our surface ships, and consequently, lying as we
did close to the enemy's main air power, we were compelled to use only
our submarines. We could not enforce the decisive blockade or
interruption which is possible from surface vessels. Our submarines
took a heavy toll but could not, by themselves, prevent the invasion of
Norway. In the Channel and in the North Sea, on the other hand, our
superior naval surface forces, aided by our submarines, will operate
with close and effective air assistance.
This brings me,
naturally, to the great question of invasion from the air, and of the
impending struggle between the British and German Air Forces. It seems
quite clear that no invasion on a scale beyond the capacity of our land
forces to crush speedily is likely to take place from the air until our
Air Force has been definitely overpowered. In the meantime, there may
be raids by parachute troops and attempted descents of airborne
soldiers. We should be able to give those gentry a warm reception both
in the air and on the ground, if they reach it in any condition to
continue the dispute. But the great question is: Can we break Hitler's
air weapon? Now, of course, it is a very great pity that we have not
got an Air Force at least equal to that of the most powerful enemy
within striking distance of these shores. But we have a very powerful
Air Force which has proved itself far superior in quality, both in men
and in many types of machine, to what we have met so far in the
numerous and fierce air battles which have been fought with the
Germans. In France, where we were at a considerable disadvantage and
lost many machines on the ground when they were standing round the
aerodromes, we were accustomed to inflict in the air losses of as much
as two and two-and-a-half to one. In the fighting over Dunkirk, which
was a sort of no-man's-land, we undoubtedly beat the German Air Force,
and gained the mastery of the local air, inflicting here a loss of
three or four to one day after day. Anyone who looks at the photographs
which were published a week or so ago of the re-embarkation, showing
the masses of troops assembled on the beach and forming an ideal target
for hours at a time, must realize that this re-embarkation would not
have been possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope of recovering
air superiority at that time and at that place.
In the
defense of this Island the advantages to the defenders will be much
greater than they were in the fighting around Dunkirk. We hope to
improve on the rate of three or four to one which was realized at
Dunkirk; and in addition all our injured machines and their crews which
get down safely-and, surprisingly, a very great many injured machines
and men do get down safely in modern air fighting-all of these will
fall, in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly. soil and live to
fight another day; whereas all the injured enemy machines and their
complements will be total losses as far as the war is concerned.
During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and
continuous aid to. the French Army, both by fighters and bombers; but
in spite of every kind of pressure we never would allow the entire
metropolitan fighter strength of the Air Force to be consumed. This
decision was painful, but it was also right, because the fortunes of
the battle in France could not have been decisively affected even if we
had thrown in our entire fighter force. That battle was lost by the
unfortunate strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforseen
power of the armored columns, and by the great preponderance of the
German Army in numbers. Our fighter Air Force might easily have been
exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle, and then we should
have found ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight. But
as it is, I am happy to inform the House that our fighter strength is
stronger at the present time relatively to the Germans, who have
suffered terrible losses, than it has ever been; and consequently we
believe ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue the war in the
air under better conditions than we have ever experienced before. I
look forward confidently to the exploits of our fighter pilots-these
splendid men, this brilliant youth-who will have the glory of saving
their native land, their island home, and all they love, from the most
deadly of all attacks.
There remains, of course, the
danger of bombing attacks, which will certainly be made very soon upon
us by the bomber forces of the enemy. It is true that the German bomber
force is superior in numbers to ours; but we have a very large bomber
force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets in Germany
without intermission. I do not at all underrate the severity of the
ordeal which lies before us; but I believe our countrymen will show
themselves capable of standing up to it, like the brave men of
Barcelona, and will be able to stand up to it, and carry on in spite of
it, at least as well as any other people in the world. Much will depend
upon this; every man and every woman will have the chance to show the
finest qualities of their race, and render the highest service to their
cause. For all of us, at this time, whatever our sphere, our station,
our occupation or our duties, it will be a help to remember the famous
lines:
He nothing common did or mean, Upon that memorable scene.
I have thought it right upon this occasion to give the House and
the country some indication of the solid, practical grounds upon which
we base our inflexible resolve to continue the war. There are a good
many people who say, "Never mind. Win or lose, sink or swim, better die
than submit to tyranny-and such a tyranny." And I do not dissociate
myself from them. But I can assure them that our professional advisers
of the three Services unitedly advise that we should carry on the war,
and that there are good and reasonable hopes of final victory. We have
fully informed and consulted all the self-governing Dominions, these
great communities far beyond the oceans who have been built up on our
laws and on our civilization, and who are absolutely free to choose
their course, but are absolutely devoted to the ancient Motherland, and
who feel themselves inspired by the same emotions which lead me to
stake our all upon duty and honor. We have fully consulted them, and I
have received from their Prime Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada,
Mr. Menzies of Australia, Mr. Fraser of New Zealand, and General Smuts
of South Africa-that wonderful man, with his immense profound mind, and
his eye watching from a distance the whole panorama of European
affairs-I have received from all these eminent men, who all have
Governments behind them elected on wide franchises, who are all there
because they represent the will of their people, messages couched in
the most moving terms in which they endorse our decision to fight on,
and declare themselves ready to share our fortunes and to persevere to
the end. That is what we are going to do.
We may now ask
ourselves: In what way has our position worsened since the beginning of
the war? It has worsened by the fact that the Germans have conquered a
large part of the coast line of Western Europe, and many small
countries have been overrun by them. This aggravates the possibilities
of air attack and adds to our naval preoccupations. It in no way
diminishes, but on the contrary definitely increases, the power of our
long-distance blockade. Similarly, the entrance of Italy into the war
increases the power of our long-distance blockade. We have stopped the
worst leak by that. We do not know whether military resistance will
come to an end in France or not, but should it do so, then of course
the Germans will be able to concentrate their forces, both military and
industrial, upon us. But for the reasons I have given to the House
these will not be found so easy to apply. If invasion has become more
imminent, as no doubt it has, we, being relieved from the task of
maintaining a large army in France, have far larger and more efficient
forces to meet it.
If Hitler can bring under his despotic
control the industries of the countries he has conquered, this will add
greatly to his already vast armament output. On the other hand, this
will not happen immediately, and we are now assured of immense,
continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all
kinds from the United States; and especially of aeroplanes and pilots
from the Dominions and across the oceans coming from regions which are
beyond the reach of enemy bombers.
I do not see how any of
these factors can operate to our detriment on balance before the winter
comes; and the winter will impose a strain upon the Nazi regime, with
almost all Europe writhing and starving under its cruel heel, which,
for all their ruthlessness, will run them very hard. We must not forget
that from the moment when we declared war on the 3rd September it was
always possible for Germany to turn all her Air Force upon this
country, together with any other devices of invasion she might
conceive, and that France could have done little or nothing to prevent
her doing so. We have, therefore, lived under this danger, in principle
and in a slightly modified form, during all these m6nths. In the
meanwhile, however, we have enormously improved our methods of defense,
and we have learned what we had no right to assume at the beginning,
namely, that the individual aircraft and the individual British pilot
have a sure and definite superiority. Therefore, in casting up this
dread balancesheet and contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned
eye, I see great reason for intense vigilance and exertion, but none
whatever for panic or despair.
During the first four years
of the last war the Allies experienced nothing but disaster and
disappointment. That was our constant fear: one blow after another,
terrible losses, frightful dangers. Everything miscarried. And yet at
the end of those four years the morale of the Allies was higher than
that of the Germans, who had moved from one aggressive triumph to
another, and who stood everywhere triumphant invaders of the lands into
which they had broken. During that war we repeatedly asked ourselves
the question: How are we going to win? and no one was able ever to
answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite
unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we were so
glutted with victory that in our folly we threw it away.
We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French
resistance will be prolonged, both in France and in the French Empire
overseas. The French Government will be throwing away great
opportunities and casting adrift their future if they do not continue
the war in accordance with their Treaty obligations, from which we have
not felt able to release them. The House will have read the historic
declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own
hearts-we have proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French
history to conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle.
However matters may go in France or with the French Government, or
other French Governments, we in this Island and in the British Empire
will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people. If we
are now called upon to endure what they have been suffering, we shall
emulate their courage, and if final victory rewards our toils they
shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We
abate nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede.
Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their causes to
our own. All these shall be restored.
What General Weygand
called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of
Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of
Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the
long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and
might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he
will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand
up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move
forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole
world, including the United States, including all that we have known
and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more
sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted
science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear
ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a
thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest hour."
